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 In researching Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 1890–
1935, Robyn Muncy looked for an alternative to the highly specialized, scientistic, 
and often market-oriented professionalism that appears to have become the domi-
nant prototype quite early in the twentieth century. Her study became, she said, a 
search for “some model for being a professional and a committed democrat,” one 
that would “square” the authority of professional credentials “with a feminist’s 
commitment to non-hierarchical relationships [and] participatory democracy.” 
She came close to finding such a model in the “female professionalism” invented 
by women who founded and lived in the urban settlement houses.1 
 Muncy’s search replicates a normatively inspired historiography recom-
mended by Van Wyck Brooks—a literary critic and contemporary of these 
progressive women. Repelled by the acquisitive individualism of America’s 
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“bustling commercial democracy” as well as an alleged dearth of public moral 
and aesthetic ideals, Brooks suggested a remedy in an article in The Dial in 
1918. He suggested that America’s literary history, more specifically what F. O. 
Matthiessen in his American Renaissance (1941) called “the age of Emerson 
and Whitman,” was “an inexhaustible storehouse of apt attitudes and adaptable 
ideals.” Properly understood and appropriated, these attitudes and ideals could 
be essential resources for an “ethic of personal growth” and a basis for criticism 
of America’s “commercial and moralistic mind.”2 Brooks’s criticism of popular 
culture may be construed as elitist and his remedy only a tonic for a few alienated 
intellectuals, but the project of constructing a “useable past” has had continuing 
resonance among American historians. Warren Susman traced the salience of this 
project among historians in two 1960 essays.3 In the late 1960s and early 1970s 
the discovery of a republican tradition—yet another useable past—instantiated 
among the Founders and then in the “chants democratic” of the working class 
throughout the nineteenth century, enabled criticism of an allegedly monolithic 
liberal tradition classically chronicled and analyzed by Louis Hartz in 1955. This 
was a discovery that could not be contained within the discipline of American 
history. America’s republican past has since become a normative resource of 
social and cultural criticism among political theorists and sociologists.4
 The recovery of American republicanism has also influenced historians 
looking for a useable past among progressives between the closing decades of 
the nineteenth century and the end of World War I. Driven in part by an interest 
in current political and intellectual issues, these historians have sought to recon-
struct the historical roots of a critical perspective that could clarify the normative 
significance of these concerns. The recent work of Mary Furner provides a good 
example. Furner has discovered a distinct strain of “new liberalism” during this 
period—one that differs markedly in its republican and democratic values from 
both the “corporate” strain of liberalism that emerged at the same time, and from 
current neo-liberalism “underway since the 1970s, with the ‘return of the market,’ 
the unprecedented sway of neoclassicism, and the multidisciplinary appeal of 
rational choice theory.”5 In 1986, as New Deal liberalism retreated before the 
ascendancy of the New Right in both Great Britain and the United States, James 
Kloppenberg published a detailed analysis of the republican and social demo-
cratic wing of American progressivism.6 Kloppenberg’s interpretation comple-
ments Furner’s in that both have detected and reconstructed a strain of robustly 
democratic-republican liberalism at odds not only with market liberalisms old 
and new, but also with the corporate, managerial, and weakly democratic liberal-
ism that dominated American politics from the end of World War II through the 
mid-1970s. Of course the history that Furner and Kloppenberg have recovered is 
a bad memory for neo-liberals and neo-conservatives. But for others who share 
the ideals of these republican and social democratic progressives, it is a history 
of their own political roots.
 The authors of the books under review have probed the Progressive Era 
for a useable past. Two of the three authors—Shelton Stromquist and Jonathan 
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Hansen—build upon the work of historians responsible for the recovery of re-
publican themes in America’s political culture. Although Daria Frezza—on the 
history faculty of the University of Siena—treats aspects of progressivism that 
also interest Stromquist and Hansen, he does not draw upon the legacy of repub-
licanism for insight. Nevertheless, like Hansen, Frezza finds in pragmatism and 
cultural pluralism a useful antidote to the racism and nativism that Stromquist 
believes characterizes the mainstream of the progressive movement.
 Like Furner and Kloppenberg, Stromquist argues that this movement pro-
vided the opening statement of the ideals and principles of a “new liberalism” 
that would eventually inform the institutions of the New Deal and the Great 
Society only to be pushed to the political margins in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century (191, 202-04). Progressivism “constituted itself in response to 
the mounting social crisis of the late nineteenth century . . . most clearly revealed 
in the battles between labor and capital and in the campaign to save wasted lives 
produced by industrial growth” (3; see also 8-9, 16, 36). Stromquist targets for 
criticism a couple of related themes at the core of this movement that become, 
for him, definitive of modern liberalism. One is a vision of “classless social har-
mony” (7; see also 23, 34, 51, 55, 194). Another is a discourse about democratic 
renewal in capitalist America that downplayed the importance of social class and 
class divisions (viii, 10-11, 16, 44, 84, 130, 167, 181, 202-04). Commitment to 
these ideas was linked to the proposition that social and economic reform did not 
depend upon alteration of “the fundamental structures of social power and prop-
erty.” Instead, they would rely upon the ameliorating effects of rapid economic 
growth and “socially responsible behavior by capital, enforced where necessary 
through legislation and state regulation” (4, 5; see also 6, 10, 23, 74,181-82). 
Unlike Furner, Stromquist does not differentiate progressive liberalism into two 
distinct strains—the one more friendly to the corporate reconstruction of the 
economy; the other more social democratic and critical of capitalism.
 While the dismissal of class analysis was definitive of the progressive-liberal 
mainstream, Stromquist insists there was an alternative approach to social reform 
and democratic renewal. The initial carriers of this alternative were Populists and 
the Knights of Labor. These “self-styled . . . ‘producers’ [articulated] a working-
class republican critique of acquisitive individualism [and argued for] . . . a more 
radical agenda [of] reform . . . based on a fundamental redistribution of class 
power . . . [that] challenged the premise of those who promoted social harmony” 
(5, 35; see also 13, 23, 59, 82). Producer republicanism and the belief that class-
based power associated with corporate restructuring was the chief impediment to 
reform influenced a wing of the progressive movement Stromquist labels “labor 
progressives.” These reformers “stood outside the narrow trade unionism of the 
American Federation of Labor leadership” and “believed only a mobilized and 
politicized working class was capable of challenging entrenched class power” 
(9, viii; see also 3, 5, 16, 166, 177, 181, 186-87, 198). The views of Frank Walsh, 
chair of the U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations (USCIR), 1913-15, were 
representative of this wing of progressivism. Walsh was impatient with academic 
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proponents of labor arbitration. He discounted a legalistic approach to ameliora-
tion of class conflict and, as an advocate for democratizing the workplace, he 
argued that “the man who toils is little more than [a] slave unless he has a voice 
in the conditions of labor” (181; see also 10, 166, 176-77, 186, 198-201). As 
an alternative to mainstream progressivism and the liberalism it spawned, these 
carriers of producer republicanism constitute, for Stromquist, the useable past 
of the progressive era. The closing lines of his book call for a “new politics of 
class that might reclaim the producerist legacy of the nineteenth century and 
challenge the entrenched power of the rich and their allies” (204).7
 Stromquist tells us very little about the republicanism of this producerist 
legacy. He is aware that economic dependence and having one’s livelihood 
and well-being depend upon the arbitrary will of another is incompatible with 
republican citizenship. Cognizance of this incompatibility led to producerist 
criticism of “wage slavery” (5; see also 181).8 Stromquist quotes labor reformer 
George McNeil who, in 1886, spoke of  “the wage-system [conflicting with] the 
republican system of government . . . and . . . soulless monopol[ies] crushing the 
manhood out of sovereign citizens” (13). Doubtless this republican contradic-
tion between economic dependence and robust citizenship motivated Laurence 
Gronlund’s socialist argument that the state “functioned as the peoples’ instrument 
‘to redress natural defects and inequalities.’” (73). My sense is that it is not so 
much the republicanism of this “producerist legacy” that interests Stromquist, 
but rather the class-consciousness and class-based politics that it represents.
 In this regard it is interesting that Stromquist has more to say about the 
republicanism of mainstream progressivism—the movement for which he has 
little sympathy. Progressives, he states, “imagined ‘the people’ as a civic com-
munity in which class would lose its meaning” (viii; see also 4, 34, 55, 56, 166, 
194). Moreover, the “notion of citizenship was drained of nineteenth-century 
producerist class partisanship” (viii). Stromquist recognizes citizenship and the 
notion of a sovereign people to whom the government is accountable as funda-
mental concepts of traditional republican self-rule. Moreover, progressive rhetoric 
incorporating “public virtue” and “the common good as a social ideal”—even 
their concern for “structural inequality”—had republican roots (4). What the 
progressives did was “reinvent” or “recast” republican principles “in a crucible 
of class conflict” (3).9
 The Achilles heal of the producerist legacy was the “ethnic and racial con-
sciousness [that] shattered any broader sense of class identity” (133). Although 
Stromquist does not make the point, the continuing salience of ethic and racial 
prejudice among workers to this day may make the political appropriation of 
this legacy extremely difficult.10 Much of his book, however, is devoted not to 
the racism and nativism of workers during the Progressive era, but rather to their 
presence among mainstream progressives. These biases along with class-based 
arrogance, Stromquist believes, narrowed significantly their views of social 
reform and democratic-republican renewal.
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 For the core of progressivism, the “social groups most susceptible to corrup-
tion [were] “identified . . . as a ‘submerged’ tenth of shiftless laborers, new im-
migrants, and African Americans” (34; see also 132). Without appropriate cultural 
assimilation, progressives believed only harm could come from the democratic 
empowerment of these groups “to reclaim the wealth it created and to realign the 
structures of power that produced inequality” (5). Cultural assimilation, however, 
meant “assimilation to [middle-class] whiteness” (132). Even the “maternalist 
reform agenda” of late nineteenth and early twentieth century “middle-class 
women’s activism was deeply infected with race and class prejudice” (110; see 
also 106-07, 110, 148-49). “Elite women [among these reformers] marginalized 
the class concerns of [female] trade unionists” (129-30). Jane Addams, the icon 
of the settlement house’s female dominion, was not immune to these biases (1-2, 
150,161-62). Progressive social scientists Simon Patten, E. A. Ross, and John R. 
Commons were also infected (132-33, 135-37). Like Patten, mainstream progres-
sives believed “racial and ethnic differences would impede . . . progress [toward] 
building a democratic community” (131; see also 138). Many were attracted to 
eugenics and saw it as a “useful ‘scientific’ tool for improving” the racial stock 
of those groups most susceptible of corruption. Condescension, even contempt, 
for poor folks who did not measure up to middle-class, Anglo-Saxon standards 
resulted in arguments for narrowing the boundaries of the democratic public. 
“New immigrants, African Americans, and the laboring poor generally,” it was 
believed, “had not been adequately prepared to exercise the responsibilities of 
citizenship” (67; see also 4-5, 7, 9, 70, 130-33, 164, 200). Jane Addams’ Hull 
House colleagues, Edith Abbott and Sophonhisba Breckinridge thought “im-
migrant children . . . must . . . be trained into a ‘civic life that has grown out of 
American experience and Anglo-Saxon tradition’” (148; see also 149).
 For Stromquist, these attitudes and their implications for public policy 
severely weaken the appeal of progressive proposals for republican-inspired 
democratic renewal. Nevertheless, even as the politics of reform during this 
period was dominated by an anxious progressivism, there were four opposing 
voices that Stromquist highlights. One was the voice of Horace Kallen. In op-
position to the progressive core, Kallen believed that the preservation of ethnic 
and cultural diversity would strengthen, not weaken, American democracy. Pro-
gressives, Kallen thought, were more troubled by “difference” than by inequality 
(139-40). Also in opposition was the voice of W. E. B. Du Bois. His appeal for 
the rights of citizenship for blacks, and his assertion that blacks could be good 
citizens without having to lose their racial identity, challenged the progressive 
stand on cultural assimilation and its opposition to expanding the franchise (156, 
160, 163-64). A third critical voice from the discipline of anthropology, that of 
Franz Boas, “debunked popular notions of racial inferiority” (154). Finally, there 
was the voice of Frank Walsh, “an iconic figure to the producerist and socialist 
wings of the labor movement” and to labor-friendly reformers who constituted 
the progressive left wing. As chair of the USCIR, Walsh was contemptuous of 
fellow commissioner John R. Commons’ “legalistic approach” to the investiga-
134  J. Robert Kent
tion of the “causes of industrial unrest.” It was an approach, Walsh believed, in 
which the “fundamentals” of class-based power in the public sphere and inside 
the workplace “remain[ed] largely untouched” (166; see also 176-77, 186).
 While Stromquist and Hansen end their books with the fragmentation of 
progressivism after World War I, Daria Frezza extends his analysis through the 
1920s and 1930s. The first half of Frezza’s book, however, treats the period that 
is the focus for the other two authors. Indeed, it corroborates and complements 
aspects of Stromquist’s interpretation while correcting others. Progressivism, 
however, is not Frezza’s principal concern. Instead he is interested in how the 
idea of democracy was influenced between 1880 and 1941 first by conservative 
ideas of “the masses” and then, beginning in the 1890s, by European theories 
of crowd psychology—especially the French school of Gustave Le Bon and 
Gabriel Tarde (3-4, 19, 51). These theories used “concepts . . . from the fields 
of criminal anthropology and psychiatric pathology in order to understand col-
lective behavior” (52). Crowds and mobs were considered deviant entities that 
overpowered participating individuals by shutting down moral sensibilities and 
generating a collective “explosion of primitive and irrational impulses” that 
under normal circumstances were under control (53, 55). 
 The influence of crowd psychology was mediated not only by academic 
and public intellectuals who appropriated the theory but also by the burgeoning 
advertising industry. Mass marketers extrapolated techniques for conditioning 
mass tastes and consumption from this body of theory (11, 98, 128, 136-37). 
During the Great War, Frezza argues, similar techniques were used by the U. S. 
government’s Committee on Public Information (CPI) to mobilize mass support 
for American participation (125-27). Finally, in the 1930s, social psychologists 
used crowd theory to understand the rapport between European dictators and 
crowds of supporters (68).
 At the beginning of Frezza’s story, the nativist middle class associated 
democracy with a rational, white, male, public—the equivalent to the sovereign 
“people” (2-3, 12-15, 60, 63). Outside the boundaries of this narrow citizenry 
were anonymous masses which, from time to time, congealed into irrational 
mobs or rebellious crowds “whose behavior was [likened to] that of women, 
savages, and children” (3; see also 20-21, 23, 54, 55, 60, 70-71, 97). The latter, 
because of their “irrational thinking and emotionalism . . . represented the three 
groups most easily swayed by . . . the ‘mental contagion’ [of mobs]” (68). By 
the end of the war social scientists who had worked for the CPI became troubled 
about the prospects for democracy given new techniques for manipulating public 
opinion. What was alarming was “the possibility that irrational [behavior] could 
erupt within [a] democratic public” (98; see also 126, 128). The differentiation 
of rational publics and irrational crowds collapsed since the behavior of both 
could be shaped by leaders who used the techniques of persuasion pioneered 
by advertising. The last half of Frezza’s book traces the fallout of this collapse 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Skepticism regarding the rationality of ordinary 
citizens “gave credence to the idea of the popular masses as incapable of judging 
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their own interests rationally” (145; see also 170-71). Skepticism regarding the 
competence of the common man suggested “a reexamination of . . . ‘government 
by the people’” (143; see also 146-48). Political scientists called for an overhaul 
of democratic theory. They argued for a value-neutral, science-based conception, 
one that took into account recently discovered realities of collective behavior and 
the need for expertise insulated from politics. The revisionist result was an idea 
of democracy that did not depend upon a rational public. Instead, all it required 
was periodic competition among contending elites for the vote of an amorphous 
electorate. Frezza treats this democratic revisionism in the context of the rise of 
European dictatorships—regimes that reproduced themselves not only through 
the use of terror, but also through the manipulative techniques of mass persua-
sion. Confronted with this growing threat, American revisionists were forced to 
shelve their skepticism and value-neutrality and defend the normative basis of 
their weakened and elitist conception of democracy (129, 142-43, 145-48, 170, 
174-75, 191, 211-15). 
 Frezza has written a well-researched and compelling book, the first half of 
which, as previously stated, complements and corrects Stromquist’s analysis. 
The latter emphasized the pervasive racism and ethnic prejudice at the core of 
progressivism. The integrity of the white, male public could be preserved only if 
“new immigrants, African Americans, and the laboring poor”—“constituencies 
most susceptible to corruption”—were disempowered (Stromquist 2006, 67-8; see 
also 70, 130-33, 164).11 While Frezza appreciates and expands upon the underly-
ing racism, his analysis of the influence of crowd psychology adds an additional 
dimension to the class-based arrogance and exclusionary attitudes of mainstream 
progressivism (3, 15, 29, 41-43, 48-49, 65-66, 112-13). “The language of race 
deeply marked the boundaries of U. S. citizenship and intertwined with the new 
theories of crowd psychology developed in Europe” (51). The appropriation 
of these theories by some Americans was relatively easy because racism and 
class-based arrogance were integrated into these theories. They provided more 
conservative progressives “a [conceptual] grid through which to [interpret] the 
behavior of the ‘dangerous classes’ seen as a potential threat [both] to social 
stability” and to the liberal traditions of Anglo-Saxon societies (53; see also 
55, 56, 65). Finally crowd theory reinforced traditional male views of women. 
Le Bon called attention to the “feminine nature” of the crowd which, like “the 
mob, women, and savages, had no legitimacy as a responsible collective subject 
because of its mutability and irrationality” (68).
 Stromquist argues that progressives, unlike producer republicans, could not 
bring themselves to recognize the stark class divisions produced by an essentially 
unregulated capitalist economy. Likewise, Frezza notices the same blind spot 
especially among social scientists. Class analysis was associated correctly with 
socialist doctrine, but scholars such as Albion Small, Franklin Giddings, and 
E. A. Ross believed “an analysis that placed the concept of class at its center 
would not apply” to the comparatively more socially mobile American society 
(32). Instead of viewing politics as a manifestation of class conflict, progressive 
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social scientists were drawn to interest-group theories. Not atypical was the 
sociologist Small who defined the new discipline as “the study of the process of 
association in groups, a pluralistic process of conflict and accommodation that 
issued in wider harmony” (40; see also 103-04).
 According to Stromquist, the theme of social harmony that ultimately nulli-
fies class conflict is at the core of the progressive mainstream. Frezza identifies 
this theme among progressives too. But he offers a correction to Stromquist’s 
analysis by noting that the rhetoric of social harmony was not exclusively pro-
gressive. Before the war John D. Rockefeller had argued for the “harmony of 
interests” between capital and labor. The argument among some employers for 
company unions as an alternative to trade unions, which allegedly only inflamed 
class-based animosity, was based on an assumed underlying harmony (152, 
155-56).12 The “ideal of classless social harmony” (Stromquist 7, 23) may be, as 
Stromquist argues, definitive of the progressive mainstream, but it is not a feature 
that differentiates this movement from capitalists and their minions. Moreover, 
although Frezza does not address this issue, the ideal of social harmony is not 
a feature that differentiates progressivism from producer republicanism either. 
After a close reading of the literature on this topic, Robert Westbrook states, 
“The crucial social division for producerists was thus not between employers 
and employees, capital and labor, but between productive and unproductive la-
bor.” Even as Eugene Debs’ criticism of corporate capitalism was turning more 
radical, he brought to the Pullman strike in 1894 the producer republican belief 
in “the common interests of labor and capital.”13
 Like Stromquist, Frezza recognizes the opposition voices of Kallen and 
Du Bois (Frezza 15, 89-91). His analysis of Boas’s criticism of racism and of 
Anglo-Saxon superiority, however, is much richer. Boas’s opposition plays a 
substantial role both in Frezza’s discussion of the progressive period before the 
Great War and in his analysis of the 1920s and 1930s. In a paper “The Mind 
of Primitive Man” published in 1901 and in a book of the same title published 
in 1911, he rejected accounts of racial hierarchies that placed “savages” with 
their so-called primitive minds on the lowest evolutionary rung. Rather, with 
respect to essential mental functions, there was a rough equality among racial 
groups across time. The differentiating factor was “culture” not “mind” whose 
definitive characteristics remained essentially the same across a plethora of his-
torically different cultures. Boas not only served as an oppositional voice to the 
racist and anti-immigrant attitudes to which Stromquist is also alert, but also to 
the racism inherent in the likening of crowd behavior to non-civilized savages. 
Here also Boas was explicitly opposed to the racism of American imperialism 
(recognized also by Stromquist, 140) whose purpose, among others, was to bring 
“civilization” to “savages” in Cuba, the Philippines, and elsewhere (92-93; see 
also 43-44, 46-47, 71-72).
 There is for Frezza another set of voices, opposed not only to the political 
conservatism and racism of the French school of crowd psychology, but also 
to the psychological theory of this school. Charles Horton Cooley complained 
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of the “‘frantic, dogmatic, psychological defense of laissez-faire’ in Le Bon’s 
work” (57).14 William James called attention to Le Bon’s “Anglomania” and was 
annoyed by his anti-socialism (56, 57). According to Frezza, however, neither 
Cooley nor James was totally at odds with Le Bon’s perspective. Cooley’s idea 
of the “social self” carried “Anglo-Saxon racial connotations” (61, 101). For 
his part, James “adopted a position quite similar to Le Bon’s on the savage and 
destructive instincts that in each us represent our heritage from the primitive 
ages, poised to reawaken in the anonymity of the crowd” (72; see also 70).
 The one consistently oppositional voice for Frezza was that of John Dewey. 
His opposition spans the period that occupies Stromquist and Hansen as well as 
the 1920s and 1930s. First, in the face of the equation of children with savages, 
Dewey celebrated the mind of the child in Democracy and Education published in 
1916 (72). Second, Dewey was a strong democrat before and after the Great War. 
He recognized the eclipse of the public in The Public and Its Problems (1927) and 
was sympathetic to Walter Lippmann’s diagnosis of American political conditions 
in Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom Public (1927). Unlike Lippmann’s 
solution which was a pacified and passive electorate in a procedural democracy 
controlled by experts, Dewey called for a revitalization of associational life in 
primary groups—here he recognized the contributions of Cooley—and for an 
education of active citizens that cultivated their common capacities for political 
judgment (98, 99, 120, 187, 213). Lippmann was disillusioned during and after 
the War by the power of propaganda to manipulate public opinion. Only the 
advanced education of experts and elites could resist this power. Dewey was 
more optimistic both about the critical faculties of ordinary citizens and about 
the efficacy of a well-structured, basic education.
 Finally, Dewey was critical of Le Bon’s psychology and its implications for 
democracy. Frezza quotes Human Nature and Conduct (1922) where, in a foot-
note, Dewey argued that Le Bon, by “assimilat[ing] the psychology of democracy 
to the psychology of the crowd in overriding individual judgment show[ed] lack 
of psychological insight.”15 In Frezza’s reading of Dewey, what Le Bon failed 
to recognize was that a cultivated, that is to say, appropriately educated “habit” 
of reflection or “intelligence” was sufficient to prevent impulsive, unthinking 
submission to the crowd “mind.” It was also sufficient to prevent a “mechanical 
chain of stimulus-response” to both advertising and political propaganda (120).
 Frezza’s analysis of these oppositional voices is insightful and indicates 
where his own sympathies lie. His analysis, however, could easily have been 
enriched by including references to several additional articles by Dewey and 
George Herbert Mead. Frezza might have noted that the anthropological con-
tribution of Franz Boas in the first year of the twentieth century was reinforced 
in an early essay by Dewey. Frezza might also have pointed to the skepticism 
of Mead and Dewey regarding Gabriel Tarde’s contribution to the psychology 
of the “social self” (98-101, 115).16 Dewey’s “Interpretation of Savage Mind,” 
published in 1902, complements Boas’s piece on “The Mind of the Primitive” 
published the preceding year. Both essays rejected the idea of  “superior races.” 
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Both argued that, whatever else may be said about cultural or racial differences, 
the “mind,” in Dewey’s words, “has a pattern, a scheme of arrangement in its 
constituent elements . . . .” As an indicator of a common humanity, this pattern 
is an equalizer between so-called “savage” and “civilized” human beings.17
 Frezza discusses the social self in the context of the contrast between educa-
tion and propaganda—that is to say, the contrast between a cultivated reflexivity 
on one hand, and passive receptivity to “suggestion” or “blind imitation” on the 
other (99). The psychologist James Mark Baldwin argued that “the self of the 
individual’s self-consciousness is, in its materials and processes of formation, 
thoroughly social in its origins” (quoted in Frezza, 100). At this level of generality 
Mead was in agreement. That Baldwin relied upon Tarde’s concept of imitation, 
however, was problematic. “Tarde looked for a psychological mechanism which 
determined the individual through attitudes and manners of the community, and 
found this in imitation.”18 But “imitation,” Mead argued, “becomes comprehen-
sible when there is a consciousness of other selves, and not before.” When those 
who “make imitation the means of getting the meaning of what others and we 
ourselves are doing, [they] seem to be . . . putting the cart before the horse.”19 
In agreement with Cooley, Mead wrote, “The mind is not first individual and 
then social. The mind itself in the individual arises through communication.”20 
Imitation, then, when it occurred, presupposes some level of self-consciousness 
which arises through communication in tandem with a conscious of others. 
 For his part Dewey, in “The Need For Social Psychology” (1917), argued 
that the “French School” of Tarde [“Imitation”] and Le Bon [“Suggestibility”] 
had set social psychology on “the wrong track.” What Tarde and “those bizarre 
writings on the psychology of the crowd” did was “carry over into science the old 
popular . . . antithesis of the individual and the social . . . .”21 Needed instead was 
a psychology of the self that recognized the reciprocal relations between protean 
minds and modifiable social environments. The outlines of such a psychology ap-
peared in the first six chapters of Democracy and Education (1916) and it looked 
quite similar to the communication-based conceptions of self-formation in the 
writings of Cooley and Mead. True, our democracy as it currently exists, “is still 
so immature that its main effect is to multiply occasions for imitation” and the 
repetition of “acts without thought.” With the proper education, however, and the 
“constructive modification of our social institutions,” Dewey insisted, a stronger 
democracy could be built that stimulated among citizens “original thought and 
. . . action deliberately adjusted in advance to cope with new forces.”22
 In The Lost Promise of Patriotism, Jonathan Hansen joins Frezza in treat-
ing John Dewey as a major opponent of the racism and ethnic prejudice at 
the core of progressivism. In this regard, both historians differ significantly
from Stromquist who places Dewey in the progressive mainstream. At best, 
Stromquist suggests, Dewey can be considered one of those marginal “liberal 
progressives” who “directed more attention to the treatment of immigrants than 
to restriction . . . , who saw the possibility of a more extended and less coercive 
assimilation process . . . [and who] affirmed a ‘cosmopolitan’ idea of American 
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nationality . . . .” (Stromquist 2006, 7, 148-49, 195-96, 202). That said, Stromquist 
flirts with what Hansen calls a “scholarly failure to distinguish [E. A.] Ross’s 
cultural commitments from the attempt of Dewey to construct an educational 
curriculum and civic ideal that would prepare individuals for a life time of social 
reciprocity and democratic deliberation” (94).23 “Social reciprocity” should not 
be confused with social harmony—the normative ideal Stromquist considers 
definitive of progressivism. Instead of eliding cultural, racial, ethnic, and status 
differences, democratic deliberation, based on mutual respect among interlocu-
tors, offers a method of reaching agreement on how to address public problems 
that is compatible with republican self-government. The chief impediment 
to social reciprocity is not the presence of difference but rather an unaccept-
able level of inequality in economic and educational resources (xviii, xxi, 12). 
Stromquist argues that mainstream progressivism was opposed to extending the 
franchise to blacks and recent immigrants. By contrast, the progressives Hansen 
singles out favored extending the privileges and immunities of citizenship to all 
Americans “regardless of ethnic, racial, economic, or gender affiliation” (2; xv, 
xvii, xx, 129, 172).
 Hansen’s book seeks an answer to the question, “What does it mean to be 
patriotic?” In addition it “poses the problem of U. S. civic identity”—that is to 
say, what does citizenship in America mean? Finally, these conundrums are linked 
to a third: “How does a country founded on liberal principles and composed of 
diverse cultures secure the solidarity required to safeguard individuality and 
promote social justice” (ix, xiv)? Like other historians looking for a useable 
past, Hansen is troubled by the current state of American political culture. He is 
troubled by narrow views of patriotism and citizenship, and by recent difficulties 
in “distinguishing democracy from mass consumption and mass consumption 
from liberalism” (xvii; see also 142). As his analysis of the Progressive Era 
unfolds, he discovers an unsatisfactory conception of patriotism competing 
with a normatively more appealing one. Hansen labels the appealing notion 
“cosmopolitan patriotism”—CP for purposes of this essay.
 The current and popular equation of patriotism with military heroism and 
uncritical loyalty to government policy during times of war inspired Hansen’s 
search for an alternative (ix). He found the martial-valor/uncritical-loyalty con-
ception and an early statement of CP in the debate between Theodore Roosevelt 
and William James over the compatibility of imperialism and republican prin-
ciples (20-21). For both the crisis in the closing decade of the nineteenth century 
was not just an economic one with social and legal repercussions. It was also 
a moral crisis with profound implications for America’s political future. Both 
men were offended by a decline of civic virtue, crowded out, they thought, by 
the acquisitive individualism associated with corporate economic reconstruction 
and abetted by laissez-faire liberalism. Both “shared the sense that a century of 
economic development had left America vulnerable to . . . material decadence” 
(4). Both offered a republican solution to a crisis for which classical liberalism 
had no remedy (7, 12, 67, 69). Roosevelt’s imperialist project was no less repub-
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lican than James’s anti-imperialism. While Hansen does not state this explicitly, 
Roosevelt and James drew upon different strains within the republican tradition. 
Reliance on distinct republican roots was responsible for their differing concep-
tions of patriotism and citizenship.24
 Classical liberalism celebrated “the ideals of a commercial bourgeoisie.” 
By constrast, Roosevelt drew upon the equally masculine republican ideals of a 
“warrior-political elite,” a citizen army, and patriotism as a manly virtue (7, 24). 
The admittedly brutal subjugation of native “savages” while instituting “civiliza-
tion” in the American West had been a national project worthy of these ideals. 
The closing of the frontier, however, required equally glorious projects if these 
ideals were not to disappear. For Roosevelt—and Hansen includes Woodrow 
Wilson in this narrative—there was a national destiny, a “manifest destiny,” to 
pursue. It was a mission to “civilize the world” and thereby “shape the destiny 
of mankind.” Moreover, in achieving this mission, “global cultural and political 
development [would have to] follow a single, universal model” (3).25 If the Ameri-
can nation-state was to compete economically, geo-politically, and culturally on 
an equal basis with Britain, France, and Germany—empire-builders all—then 
imperialism was a necessary step forward. “In confronting Spain and quashing 
the Filipino resistance,” Hansen argues, “Roosevelt recognized the project that 
would redeem American virtue and restore significance to American life” (22; 
see also 3, 12-13, 23-25). Roosevelt adhered to a strain of republicanism less 
committed to democracy than to what Hansen calls “organic nationalism.” This 
was a perspective that venerated the state as the principal instrument for achiev-
ing the nation’s destiny. It was a view that championed war and other policies 
that promoted national regeneration and America’s stature in the world while 
subordinating “individual liberty, equal opportunity, and government by consent” 
(36; see also 18-19). Tied to organic nationalism was a view of citizenship and 
patriotism that valued less a citizen’s intellectual autonomy in discerning the 
common good than his unquestioned obedience to state policy and self-sacrifice 
on its behalf. The soldier’s “faith” and sacrifice in war was iconic for these na-
tionalists. In words that would have pleased Roosevelt, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
said admiringly, this faith “leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience 
to blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of 
campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the 
use” (16; see also 14-15, 68, 92, 179).
 James was joined by Eugene V. Debs, Jane Addams, John Dewey, W. E. 
B. Du Bois, Louis Brandeis, Horace Kallen, and Randoph Bourne in oppos-
ing this view of patriotism, citizenship, and nationalism. Hansen constructs an 
interpretation of CP drawing principally upon the writings of the first five of 
these individuals. He constructs intellectual portraits of these major contribu-
tors and examines their differences. In order to clarify the definitive features of 
CP, Hansen differentiates it from two other perspectives on American identity 
opposed to the prevailing cultural chauvinism—the “universalist” positions of 
philosopher Morris Cohen and Israel Zangwill; and the “cultural pluralism” of 
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Kallen and Bourne. Hansen’s analysis of the specific differences between Kal-
len on one hand, and Dewey, Addams, and Du Bois on the other, is outstanding. 
His thoughtful critique of Bourne’s elitism may come as a surprise to admirers 
of Bourne. However, outlining the essential features of CP—the recovery of 
which is Hansen’s central purpose—does not require reviewing his readings of 
individual proponents or his analysis of these other oppositional perspectives.
 “The foremost aim of . . . cosmopolitan patriots,” Hansen writes, “was to 
end the . . . conflation of citizenship with cultural homogeneity at the heart of 
American nationalism” (39). In this regard, proponents criticized the Anglo-
Saxon arrogance of both organic nationalism and the cultural conservatism of 
E. A. Ross (92-94, 105-06). The trick for proponents of CP was to celebrate 
cultural diversity while offering republican and democratic means for achieving 
national cohesion and solidarity. Such a move rejected an ethnic or racial basis 
for American civic identity. Instead, adherents of CP argued that revitalization 
of a democratic-republican political culture could be and should be the basis of 
national solidarity. It was to be a culture founded upon such principles as the rule 
of law, individual autonomy, equal opportunity, and social justice (xiv-xvii, xx, 
2, 4, 69, 75, 86, 114, 118, 128). Defined by commitment to such principles, it 
was neutral with respect to the cultural peculiarities of various ethnic and racial 
groups. Indeed the vitality and reproduction of this political culture required 
“cultural contact” and “common civic endeavors”—that is to say, democratic 
social reciprocity (74, 83-84, 112, 118, 126, 128, 215 nt. 215). The danger was 
that “a breakdown of the institution of reciprocal exchange [would allow] the 
influence of a single group or faction [to] hinder the self-realization of others” 
(75; see also 81). Contrary to organic nationalists, “the proper object of patriotic 
loyalty was not the American nation-state but the ideal of democratic social 
reciprocity for which the nation-state was a vehicle” (67; see also 70, 192 nt. 8).
 What makes this view of patriotism “cosmopolitan”? Hansen’s answer is 
threefold. First, CP proponents put forth a transnational global ethic. The defining 
principles of democratic republicanism should be the basis not only of national 
solidarity but of international relations and justice as well. Democratic social 
reciprocity founded upon mutual respect was considered a universal moral and 
political principle (xv, xvii, xx, 3, 4). Second, CP proponents recognized that 
“individuals maintain multiple overlapping . . . local, national, and international 
affiliations” (xvi; xiv-xv, vii, xxi, 93, 114). Multiple affiliations produced com-
peting allegiances and loyalties—say, for example, between cultural or religious 
identification and the obligations of citizenship. Tensions, therefore, were un-
avoidable but Americans should “refuse to separate the privileges and immunities 
[they] enjoy from the plight of individuals and communities around the world” 
(xvii). Unlike some strains of cosmopolitanism, CPs did not devalue the impor-
tance of the citizen’s sense of national belonging. Nevertheless, they pondered 
over the question of whether it “was possible to cultivate the community-forming 
aspects of national affiliation . . . without promoting the chauvinism that too 
often accompanied them” (93; see also xvii, 3, 112-13). Finally, proponents of 
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CP were cosmopolitan because their principle of democratic social reciprocity 
was based on a belief in “the equal moral standing of all human beings.” It was 
this normative belief in a common humanity, along with their affinity for Boas’s 
anthropology, that accounts for their rejection of the savagery-civilization di-
chotomy championed by Roosevelt (xvii, 3, 17-18, 33, 37).
 In comparing the Hansen and Stromquist books it is important to recognize 
that Stromquist wants to establish the existence of a Progressive movement. 
By contrast, Hansen tells his readers, proponents of CP did not constitute a co-
hesive intellectual community, and none of them used the label, cosmopolitan 
patriotism. CP is Hansen’s label for a conception of patriotism abstracted from 
the proponents’ “independent but overlapping criticism” (xiv). Stromquist and 
Hansen can be compared more usefully by reflecting upon their respective treat-
ments of liberalism. Stromquist traces the roots of twentieth century liberalism 
to the Progressive movement. In their rejection of “classical” or laissez-faire 
liberalism, progressives constructed a “new” liberalism more consonant with the 
emerging corporate reconstruction of the economy. It was still liberal in so far 
as it celebrated the sanctity of the individual; but the essential theme that unites 
progressivism with late twentieth century liberalism is a common rejection of 
both a class-based understanding of power and class-based politics.
 For his part, Hansen provides the basis for a different and more nuanced con-
ception of progressive, new liberalism. However, no such conception is developed 
in the book. It was indicated earlier that the “social reciprocity” endorsed by pro-
ponents of CP is not another name for the ideal of  “social harmony” Stromquist 
thinks is definitive of progressivism. Moreover, the rejection of interest-group 
politics by James and Dewey put them outside Stromquist’s mainstream (72). 
What Dewey said of the identity politics implicit in Kallen’s cultural pluralism 
applies also to interest group politics: they both “merely perpetuated in group 
form America’s ‘legalistic individualism’ as hostile as militarism to genuine 
civic mindedness . . . .” (118). Finally, the “social democratic ethic” at the core 
of CP pointed toward some form of statist redistribution. How else, proponents 
asked, could unacceptable levels of inequality be prevented and sufficient access 
to resources necessary for individual autonomy and self-realization be assured 
(xiv, 67, 115, 123)? In opposing E. A. Ross’s cultural conservatism, CP delineated 
“a model of liberal citizenship” and, along with the cultural pluralism of Kallen 
and Bourne, constituted “a [new] liberal front” (xiv, 93). Yet, the articulation of 
CP among diverse proponents represented one of those “occasional outbreaks of 
republicanism in what has been a predominantly liberal tradition” (187). Hansen 
considers the social and political criticism of CP proponents “republican” because 
of its “emphasis on a common good, [its] commitment to communally derived, 
impersonal standards of achievement, and [its] appreciation that vitality lay not 
in pursuit of luxury and leisure, but in the open-ended pursuit of excellence and 
in safeguarding individual autonomy” (69; 187). Clearly the new liberalism that 
informs CP is different from the new liberalism that interests Stromquist.
 Apparently both historians fail to see the bifurcation of American new 
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liberalism into two strains during the period framing their narratives. Mary 
Furner’s recent writings have contributed enormously to our understanding 
of these strains, which she labels “corporate liberalism” and “democratic stat-
ism” (see note 5). Both strains “provided collectivist alternatives to classical 
and neoclassical individualism.”26 Influenced by the writings of Martin Sklar, 
especially The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 
(1988), Furner argues that corporate liberalism was “a body of social theory 
and policy advice that left economic and social ordering largely to cooperative 
arrangements between organized private parties, agreeing voluntarily among 
themselves.” By contrast, the other strain “was more democratic [and] statist . . 
. combin[ing] social purposes recovered from republicanism with a new, more 
positive conception of what the state could accomplish without itself becoming 
a threat to liberty.”27 Furner traces the republican roots of democratic statism 
to the ideals and labor theory of the producerist movement.28 Her thesis is that 
these two strains of modern liberalism “set the parameters of political discourse 
from the 1880s to the New Deal.”29
 There is clearly an affinity between corporate liberalism and Stromquist’s 
progressive mainstream. Is there a corresponding affinity between democratic 
statism and proponents of CP? Robert Westbrook (see note 13) links democratic 
statism to the views of three principal CP proponents: Jane Addams, John Dewey, 
and Eugene Debs. Moreover, in a move that Stromquist would reject, Westbrook 
argues that Addams and Dewey contributed to the transformation of producer 
republicanism into the democratic-collectivist strain of new liberalism.30 
 Stromquist has written an engaging synthesis of recent scholarship on the 
Progressive Era. Frezza’s book is an ambitious, interdisciplinary history. Han-
sen’s study is a major, but more narrowly focused, contribution. There remains 
to be done a project that would build upon Furner’s conception of American new 
liberalism and integrate the insights of these three historians.
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